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Chapter 10:  
Football banning orders: the highly effective cornerstone of a preventative 
strategy? 
Matt Hopkins and Niall Hamilton-Smith  
 
Abstract 
The incremental development of restrictive measures and control orders intended to prevent football 
hooliganism has been noted by academics in both England and Scotland. Despite suggestions that 
the ‘hooliganism problem’ reached its peak in the 1980’s, repressive forms of legislation (such as the 
Football Banning Order) have still been implemented to target supporters labelled as a ‘risk’.  In this 
chapter, consideration is given as why such repressive forms of control have been implemented and 
how successful they have been. It is argued a perception exists within media, government and 
policing that unacceptable forms of behaviour perpetrated by risk supporters need to be tackled 
through such control orders and although the use such orders circumvents traditional values of due 
process, ethical issues remain of secondary importance to tackling the problem of hooliganism. That 
said, evidence in relation to the efficacy of such orders remains patchy and requires further 
systematic evaluation. 
Introduction 
On 14th April 2013 Millwall played Wigan Athletic in the semi-final of the FA Cup at Wembley 
Stadium. Disorder involving Millwall supporters at one of the Football Associations showpiece events 
firmly placed the subject of football hooliganism back in the public sphere. The events at Wembley 
were followed by disorder at the Newcastle verses Sunderland game where 29 arrests were made 
on the day of the game (in total 106 were made) and a horse was captured on camera being 
punched by a Newcastle supporter.  As the media predictably referred to ‘shameful events’ that 
were ‘reminiscent of the dark days of football riots in the 1970’s and 80’s’ (Watson & Brooke, 2013), 
political attention turned to what measures are in place to prevent football-related disorder. This 
subject was raised in parliament when, on 13th May, Dan Jarvis (Labour Barnsley central) asked the 
secretary of state for the Home Office what steps had been to (a) enforce banning orders and (b) 
reduce levels of violence around matches. On behalf of the Home Secretary, the Home Office 
minister Damian Green responded:  
Football banning orders are the highly effective cornerstone of our preventative strategy ….. the 
Home Office continues to make funding available to support local police operations gathering 
evidence and seeking football banning orders against persons who have been involved in football-
related violence or disorder at matches. 
Hansard, 2013.  
In England and Wales, the current version of the football banning order (FBO) was legislated for in 
the Football (Disorder) Act (2000). In Scotland, the banning order was not legislated for until 2006 (in 
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the Police, Public Order and Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act), with subsequent developments in 
relation to the Offensive Behaviour and Threatening Communications Act (2012) more firmly 
cementing the banning order at the centre of any Scottish strategy to tackle disorder in relation to 
football matches. Intended to tackle the problem of sectarianism (rather than the types of football 
related disorder observed in England), the official Scottish Government position is that ‘the 
introduction of Football Banning orders is a major milestone in the Governments efforts to rid 
Scotland of football hooliganism and sectarian bigotry’ (Scottish Government, 2013).      
Although the banning order seems to be strongly favoured both in England/ Wales and Scotland as a 
strategy to prevent football related disorder (or sectarianism in Scotland), its implementation has 
raised concerns amongst academics and football supporters alike. In particular the powers to issue 
banning orders on complaint (14b orders in England or summary orders in Scotland) where 
restrictions can be placed on an individual without any conviction in court, have led to criticisms of 
the orders being draconian and a disproportionate response to the threat of disorder. Also, claims 
have been made that orders have been imposed on fans who are not ‘risk supporters’ and have 
been unfairly targeted by the police (see for example, Football Supporters Federation, 2013). In this 
chapter we consider the implementation of football banning orders and how they became central to 
tackling football-related disorder in England and Scotland. First, we present an overview of the 
development of such forms of restrictive legislation and how they have been used to try and prevent 
football hooliganism. Second, we focus on the implementation of the football banning order in 
England and Scotland and finally, we consider what evidence exists to suggest that banning orders 
have reduced football related disorder.   
Restrictive, exclusionary and risk-based approaches to the prevention of football violence  
Giuliantti (1994) suggests football hooliganism developed as a definitive social policy issue in-
between 1968-70 when it became embedded in ‘national and governmental consciousness’ 
(Giuliantii, 1994:14). Since then politicians have ‘amplified’ or ‘de-amplified’ football related violence 
as an issue of social policy concern. For example, there have been periods of amplification (such as 
between 1971-8) in order to justify more centralised and assertive forms of government 
interference (as was observed in the new right ascendancy between 1979-84) and de-amplification 
(between 1986-89) in order to confirm the efficacy of measures previously implemented.  
Since the politicisation of football hooliganism as a social problem, many preventative strategies 
have been suggested or implemented. More draconian suggestions include identity cards and the 
erection of electric fences. Measures actually implemented include the widespread introduction of 
CCTV in to stadiums, segregation of fans, restrictions on alcohol sales in and around stadiums, 
changes to kick off times and bans on away supporters (see Frosdick & Marsh, 2005).   Although it 
has been suggested that many of these measures have helped to reduce football violence (especially 
within stadiums), legislation encouraging more proactive forms of policing has also been introduced.  
Indeed, the cornerstone of the current policing strategy to tackle football violence is the football 
banning order. The FBO continued a trend in the incremental development of restrictive or control 
orders for football supporters (see Stott and Pearson, 2006, 2008; Hamilton-Smith & Hopkins, 2013) 
of which key developments are outlined at Table 1. The ‘exclusion’ order (legislated for in the Public 
order Act, 1986) and the ‘restriction’ order (under the Football Spectators Act, 1989) had been used 
to ban convicted supporters from football matches at home and abroad. The Football (Offences and 
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Disorder) Act (1999) created international and domestic banning orders and widened the 
circumstances in which orders could be made, though the Football (Disorder) Act (2000) created the 
order as it is commonly used at present. The Act removed the distinction between international and 
domestic banning orders, further extended the scope of restrictions and allowed for civil (14b) 
orders to be imposed in the absence of any conviction. For orders imposed in addition to a 
conviction (14a orders), bans from attending specified regulated domestic football matches could be 
made for a period of up to ten years (these were five years for a civil or 14b order), all orders could 
include restrictions that went beyond stadia include to locations that also attracted trouble on 
match days and the surrender of passports to prevent travel abroad to England matches.   The most 
contentious aspect of the legislation was the civil order (14b/ or orders on compliant) where an 
application could be made by a chief police officer to a court to issue an FBO on the basis of police 
intelligence to suggest there were ‘reasonable grounds to believe that making a banning order would 
help to prevent violence or disorder.’1 This aspect of the legislation was a product of a paradigm shift 
in criminal justice towards risk-based forms of preventative measures/orders that aimed to prevent 
offending by placing restrictions individuals in the absence of a criminal conviction. Other examples 
include the Parental Control Order and the Anti-Social Behaviour Order (Zedner, 2009). Such orders 
are designed to target populations ‘deemed to pose a threat’ (Zedner, 2009:81) though some 
scholars suggest they create a sense that traditional values of due process; the presumption of 
innocence, proof beyond reasonable doubt and the proportionality of punishment are legal luxuries 
ill suited to present perils (Ignatieff, 2004).  
Although heavily criticised as draconian, civil orders were borne out of frustration over failed 
attempts to place restrictions on known troublemakers who had not been convicted of a football-
related offence. However, concerns have been expressed over the potential misuse of such powers 
and if the restrictions are proportionate to the end goal of preventing football-related violence (Stott 
& Pearson, 2006). Key to the debate on proportionality was a ruling made by the Court of Appeal to 
a civil liberties challenge to the Football (Disorder) Act 2000 made by two ‘risk’ supporters in 2000 
(see Pearson, 2002). In this test case, Gough and Smith2 challenged the application made to impose 
a civil banning order on them, claiming the conditions were in breach of their human rights. In this 
case, The Court of Appeal used the de Freitis test of proportionality to consider whether (i) the 
prevention of football violence by English fans abroad was sufficiently important to justify limiting a 
fundamental right of EU nationals to leave their territory; (ii) the measures designed to meet the 
legislative objective (the prevention of football violence abroad) were rationally connected to it; and 
(iii) the means used to impair the right to freedom were no more than necessary to achieve the 
objective (Stott & Pearson, 2006: 6). In this case, the challenge made by Gough and Smith was 
unsuccessful. Pearson (2002) makes two criticisms of the ruling. First, he draws attention to the fact 
that the Court of Appeal concluded an FBO should only be imposed where there is ‘an exacting 
standard of proof that will, in practice, be hard to distinguish from the criminal standard’ (Pearson 
2002: 96). He goes on to argue that this proposed ‘quasi-criminal’ burden of proof for banning 
orders appears to contradict the original rationale for the introduction of the 2000 Act (that there 
was not sufficient evidence to charge those suspected of involvement in football-related disorder). 
                                                          
1 Section 14B, Football Spectators Act (1989), amended in Schedule One, Football (Disorder) Act 2000: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1989/37/section/14B 
2
 Police intelligence suggested Gough and Smith were part of the Derby County hooligan firm ‘The Derby Lunatic Fringe’.   
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Second, he is critical of the reluctance of the Court of Appeal to apply key human rights principles to 
football supporters. 
Table 1: The incremental development of legislation implemented to prevent hooliganism  
Legislation Year Key areas in relation to football hooliganism 
Public Order Act 1986 
Created offences commonly used by police in England and Wales 
to deal with public disorder and violence at football matches. This 
Act created exclusion orders that worked to ban individuals 
domestically. Duration of orders at discretion of courts.  
Football Spectators Act 1989 
Development of what was called at the time a restriction or 
international orders. Those convicted of a relevant offence/ 
football-related offence committed in England and Wales or 
notification of a conviction in a foreign court for a corresponding 
offence up could be subjected to a restriction order of up to five 
years- requirement to report to a police station on occasion of 
designated football matches.  
Football (Offences and 
Disorder) Act 
1999 
Introduced domestic and international football banning orders. 
This widened the circumstances in which the courts could make 
orders under the 1986 and 1989 Acts and extended the ambit of 
the offences to ticket-touting and indecent or racialist chanting. 
Football (Disorder) Act 2000 
Created banning orders in current form.  Broadened the scope of 
the power of the banning order by restricting individuals on 
banning orders to travel at certain times and in certain area in 
relation to football matches played both domestically and 
internationally. Introduced banning orders on complaint brought 
by the police (prior to this football banning orders could only be 
prompted by a conviction for a football related offence). Orders 
imposed for 3 to 10 years.  
Note:  Non-football specific legislation is also commonly used against football supporters. For example Section 27 of Violent Crime 
Reduction Act allows police to move someone from a specified area for a period of up to 48 hours. No offence needs to have been 
committed for the act to be enforced: the legislation gives police the power to move on people who they say pose a risk of alcohol-related 
disorder (see FSF, 2013). Section 52 of the Act also repeals Section 52 (2) of the Football (Disorder Act) which set a latest date for 
applications of 27Th August 2007.  
 
 
In Scotland it was domestic matters that convinced legislators of the need for banning orders. 
Indeed, Scottish football supporters (at least since the early 1980’s) have often been commended for 
their exemplary (although often very drunken) behaviour when following their national team 
abroad. As some have commented, the tartan army have used this form of high spirited, but non-
aggressive behaviour as a way to distinguish themselves from the English (see Giulianotti, 2005). 
However, at a domestic level, Scottish football has often been associated with sectarianism3- most 
commonly linked to the two biggest clubs and also fiercest rivals in Scotland- Glasgow Rangers and 
Celtic4 (see Burdsey & Chappell, 2001; and also Flint & Powell in this volume). Sectarianism is a 
highly contested term (Flint & Powell, 2011), but is commonly thought of as bigotry, prejudice, 
hatred or discrimination focussed upon some aspect(s) of religious, ethnic or political identity (Flint 
and Kelly 2013). The traditional identity of Rangers as ‘British Protestant’ (and loyalist) and Celtic as 
                                                          
3 It should also be noted that the types of hooliganism involving ‘firms’ or ‘casuals’ commonly observed in England were also evident in 
Scotland. Indeed, the birth of causal culture is often attributed to the ‘Aberdeen Casuals’ who were notorious through Scotland in the 
1980’s.   
4 Sectarian allegiances can also be found amongst other football clubs in Scotland. For example, Heart of Midlothian (Protestant) and their 
Catholic Edinburgh city rivals Hibernian.  
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‘Irish Catholic’ (and republican) has both defined their identities, both also created concerns in 
official circles about how displays of sectarianism heighten tensions on match days and also lead to 
wider sectarian tensions across Scotland. These concerns were raised in the 2006 Action Plan on 
Tackling Sectarianism in Scotland (Scottish Executive, 2006) and paved the way for the 
implementation of FBO’s to tackle sectarian behaviours at football matches.    However, as in 
England, this too was implemented against a backdrop of what was widely perceived to be a 
sustained decline in football related violence and disorder (Hamilton-Smith et. al., 2011), and indeed 
against the backdrop of accumulating evidence that in Scotland many of the more substantive 
manifestations of sectarian prejudice and discrimination (such as housing segregation and 
employment discrimination) were also in long-term decline (Bruce et al., 2004; 2006) 
The implementation of football banning orders  
As illustrated in Table 2, on average around 3,000 banning orders (14a and 14b) are in force in 
England and Wales each football season. In Scotland, it is more difficult to identify any trend as data 
are only available from 2006. However, though FBO numbers grew steadily through the first six 
years up to 2011-12 (only falling back to 150 enforced orders in 2012-13) it is clear that far fewer 
orders are imposed when compared to England and Wales. As Hamilton-Smith & Hopkins (2013) 
note the smaller number of orders issued in Scotland per season could be explained by the fact that 
fewer professional clubs operate. However, they also observe that the rate at which banning orders 
are imposed per club is smaller in Scotland than in England and that, in England, banning orders are 
issued disproportionately in the lower divisions (with hardly any at all issued in the Scottish lower 
divisions).  For example, whereas as several football clubs in England had banning order rates of over 
5 per every 1,000 spectators that attended games (in the 2008-09 season), no Scottish football clubs 
had a rate of over 1 per 1,000 spectators.  It was also observed that, in England, banning order rates 
per 1,000 spectators increased further down the leagues; with a rate of 2.3 for League 1 and 2.4 for 
League 2 as compared to 1 per 1,000 in the Premier League (again for the 2008-09 season). 
Table 2: Banning orders in force: a comparison of England/ Wales to Scotland (14a and 14b banning orders) 
Season Banning orders: England and 
Wales 
Scotland 
2001-02 687 - 
2002-03 1149 - 
2003-04 2596 - 
2004-05 3153 - 
2005-06 3387 - 
2006-07 3203 5  
2007-08 3172 25 
2008-09 3180 53 
2009-10 3248 80 
2010-11 3173 129 
2011-12 2750 197 
Source: National statistics on football: these are orders in normally in force around November of each season. In 2011-12, 493 applications 
for new orders were successful in England and Wales.  
Further analysis of data from England/Wales and Scotland revealed that in both jurisdictions around 
13% of all are orders granted are via the 14b route (for example, in 2008-09 in England/ Wales 418 
14b orders were issued) and that offences related to the imposition of 14a orders were broadly 
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similar across both jurisdictions. For example, Table 3 presents an overview of the main offence 
types relating to all banning orders imposed via the 14a route in England and Wales in 2008-09 
season. Thus, the ‘football-related’ offences for which orders were deemed appropriate were 
commonly linked to public order offences (in around 70% of cases) though a range of offences from 
violent disorder to ticket touting could provide the conviction required for a 14a banning order.   
Although the lower rate of orders in Scotland could plausibly be explained by an absence of 
hooliganism (or sectarianism related disorder), there is clear judicial resistance to the widespread 
use of an Act that was seen as an English instrument designed to target English problems. In 
particular, there is a reluctance – perhaps reinforced by the absence of an equivalent problem of 
Scottish ‘hooligans’ travelling abroad – to use the legislation except in its narrowest terms to focus 
on fans convicted of offences inside football Stadia (Hamilton-Smith and McArdle 2013).  Thus, there 
has been little appetite for imposing restrictions on fans beyond attendance at football stadia, or 
utilising civil powers to ban non-convicted individuals on the basis of a ‘balance of probabilities’.   
Such scepticism has also strongly been reinforced by a lack of resourcing to incentivise banning 
order use, as well as difficulties encountered in imposing orders for sectarian incidents (Hamilton-
Smith & Hopkins 2013). In England banning orders are managed by the UK Football Policing Unit, 
who provide funds for police forces to pursue intelligence packages to target ‘risk supporters’ for 
14b orders (and also provide intelligence in relation 14a orders). In England, most police forces have 
Football Intelligence Officers and Banning Order Officers who have time to build intelligence 
packages on risk supporters at most football clubs and also prepare cases before they go to court. In 
Scotland, although most clubs have a Football Intelligence Officer, these roles are often part-time 
which limits the extent that officers can gather intelligence and liaise with the relevant criminal 
justice agencies in order to progress cases.  In addition, a conviction for a violent offence is more 
likely to generate an FBO than a conviction for a sectarian offence. As Hamilton-Smith & Hopkins 
(2013:291) suggest ‘sectarian offences that involved insult rather than actual violence threw up a 
range of practical and legal challenges’ and proving an offence is sectarian poses a number of 
difficulties. Despite this, the Scottish Government is committed to imposing larger numbers of 
banning orders. Around £1.8m has been invested in a new National Football Policing Unit and the 
recent news that the number of banning orders imposed increased- from 33 in 2010 to 92 in 2012- 
was warmly welcomed by the Scottish Government (Daily Record, March 2013). 
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Table 3: Offences related to the imposition of 14a banning orders: England and Wales (2008-09) 
Act and section Offence Type % of all offences (number)  
Public Order Act 1986- S4 Fear/ provocation 21% (n=568) 
 
Public Order Act 1986- S5 Harassment/ alarm 20% (n=553) 
 
Public Order Act 1986- S3  Affray 15% (n=411) 
 
Public Order Act 1986- S2 Violent disorder 15% (n=406) 
 
Football (Offences) Act 1991- S4 Pitch invasion 6% (n=168) 
 
Sporting Events Act 1985- S2 Drunkenness 5% (n=137) 
 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act- S39 Inferences from 
silence 
4% (n=106) 
 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act- 1994 
S166 
Ticket touting 2% (n=64) 
 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act- S91 Supply/ possession of 
video recordings 
2% (n=64) 
 
Football (Offences) Act 1991- S2 Missile Throwing 2% (n=46) 
 
Football (Disorder) Act 2000- S14J Breach of order 1% (n=37) 
 
Police Act 1996- S89 Assault of police 
officer 
1% (n=35) 
Public Order Act 1986- S4a Intentional 
harassment 
1% (n=34) 
Others   5% (n=136) 
 
Total  100 (n=2,765)  
 
Source: UKFPU banning order data 2008-09 (data where offences resulting in banning order were known).   
Whilst it has been argued that the relative restraint observed in Scotland is ‘as much driven by 
considerations of economy as of due process’ (Hamilton-Smith & Hopkins, 2013:291) concerns in 
England and Wales have often focused on what is often seen as the unfair use of such powers 
(particularly in relation to 14b orders). The burden of proof required to prove that offences are (a) 
football related and (b) a banning order is likely to prevent future violence is open to much 
interpretation. Although banning orders have been imposed where both of these criteria have been 
in question, court rulings have made it clear that there should be a distinction drawn between 
violence arising directly from the football/violence or disorder carried out by those who follow 
football and that probably would have occurred despite the fact the defendants are football 
supporters. For example, after organised violence between Northampton Town fans and Crystal 
Palace fans on Caledonian Road, North London in 2006, a court ruled that to impose an order for 
street violence the incident had to relate to a football match and that the violence had to be a direct 
result of football connections. In this case both sets of fans had been to different matches, but 
arranged to meet after the games they had attended. Thus the court ruled the violence was directly 
connected to a football match rather than being resultant of something incidental to football (R v 
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Arbery & Mobley, 2008 as cited in Gurden, 2012). In addition, it was also ruled in Gough v Chief 
Constable of Derbyshire (2002) that the risk of future repetition of violence or disorder at a match is 
not automatically satisfied simply because the defendant had previously engaged in violence. Such 
previous violence must indicate a likely future involvement in football-related violence.  
 
Claims have been made by football supporters that they have been unfairly targeted for bans. 
Hopkins (2013) conducted interviews across seven police areas (with Match Commanders, Football 
Intelligence Officers and Force Banning Officers) in order to further understand police officer 
perceptions of the operation and impact of banning orders. Here it was observed that officers 
claimed they only target football supporters perceived as being ‘risk supporters’, in the words of one 
officer ‘those actually connected to a football hooligan element’ (Hopkins 2013: 7). However, despite 
an ACPO definition of ‘risk supporter’ existing (a person posing a risk to public order and anti-social 
behaviour in connection with a football event (NPIA, 2010)), none of the respondents actually 
referred to this guidance and they tended to describe how they focused attention on gathering 
intelligence in relation to those risk supporters they labelled as ‘casuals’, ‘those in Stone Island gear’, 
‘those seeking out and planning disorder’. Whilst officers were keen to justify such activities as part 
of the preventative function of their work, there also appeared to be scope to monitor individuals 
who may associate with the risk group, but actually posed little threat. Whilst an evidential standard 
close to that admissible in court was supposed to be gathered, the research identified significant 
variation in practice from area to area. Indeed, some police officers queried the ‘flimsy evidential 
packages’ that seemed to be admissible in courts in some areas and (as the quote from a Football 
Intelligence Officer illustrates below) examples were given where banning orders had been imposed 
purely because supporters had been in the wrong place at the time:  
 
In [European place name] there was really bad violence and we got a huge number of bans out of that one. 
Some of then had never come up before and were literally banned because of the one match. It was more 
serious because it was abroad; we had no trouble with the courts in getting bans for that one.  
Hopkins (2013:8) 
These findings seem to echo those of James & Pearson (2006) who conducted research in relation to 
the application process for the imposition of an FBO by conducting court-based observations. They 
highlighted that it was common for Magistrates to accept evidence that appeared to be ‘guilt by 
association’ rather than the exacting a standard of criminal proof as recommended in the Gough & 
Smith ruling and in some circumstances, there was an obsession with compiling evidence for profiles 
to secure civil FBOs, ‘which could be curtailing opportunities for proffering criminal charges’ (James 
& Pearson; 2006: 528). Indeed, concerns over the unfair targeting of 14b banning orders has been 
the subject of national debate, with several fan groups raising concerns over the powers and how 
they have been used against fans not considered to be ‘hooligans’ or part of the risk element (see 
FSF, 2013). In addition to this, James & Pearson (2006) identified that contesting the order in court 
can actually lead to more severe conditions being imposed and that often orders are not contested 
as a defeated challenge can result in a defendant having to pay higher court fees.   
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The impact of banning orders on football violence/ disorder  
It might logically be concluded that, if targeted correctly FBOs should impact on future levels of 
disorder and violence. In respect to England, the official Home Office view is that banning orders 
‘transform the behaviour of risk supporters’ and that by the time the order has expired ‘in 92% of 
cases the person is felt by the police to no longer pose a threat’ (Home Office, 2013). Whilst these 
confident claims are impressive, they are also problematic. Indeed, the claims made by the Home 
Office are not supported by any evidence (thus it is difficult to ascertain how the 92% figure has 
been derived) and as asserted by Hopkins (2013) and Hamilton-Smith & Hopkins (2013), the lack of 
any rigorous independent evaluation of the impact of banning orders on levels of disorder make it 
difficult to draw conclusions about their efficacy. However, it should acknowledged that evaluating 
the efficacy of the order is problematic as (a) reliable data in relation to football related disorder are 
difficult to collect and (b) it is difficult to ascertain whether orders themselves (or other factors) lead 
to reductions in disorder.  For instance, whilst the evaluation of FBOs in Scotland (Hamilton-Smith et. 
al., 2011) tentatively associated the imposition of Orders with a reduction in the overall volume of 
offending by recipients, such recipients were still more likely to engage in future football-related 
disorder when compared to non-recipients who had been convicted of a football-related offence.  
Moreover, the evaluation was not in a position to attempt to link the imposition of FBOs with any 
broader impact on disorder at or around football stadia.    
As a result of interviews with police football intelligence, match commanders and force banning 
officers, Hopkins (2013) suggests banning orders could impact upon hooliganism by having a both a 
specific and general deterrence effect. Specific deterrence can be observed when ‘the apprehended 
and punished offender refrains from repeat offending because they realise they are certain to be 
caught and punished’ (Hopkins-Burke, 2010:47). General deterrence works when the punishment of 
offenders by the state is ‘seen to serve as an example to the general population who will be 
frightened into non-participation in criminal behaviour (Hopkins-Burke, 2009:47).     In interview, 
police officers suggested that football banning orders serve a specific deterrence function by 
targeting the population of hooligans labelled as the ‘the hardcore element’ as they realise there 
direct are consequences to their actions (Hopkins, 2013). Police officers also suggested that a 
general deterrence effect is observed as the behaviour of many risk supporters is modified. Indeed, 
‘non-participation in hooliganism’ is often not driven by the threat of any criminal justice sanction, 
but by threatening risk supporters with exclusion from stadiums and being able to follow their team 
(Hopkins, 2013). Thus, the strong pursuit of the ‘risk element’ for banning orders was thought to 
send out a message that the police were monitoring the behaviour of risk supporters and that any 
risk supporter could be targeted next (Hopkins 2013). In contrast, in Scotland, the enforcement 
strategy is very much focussed on using resources to enhance the specific deterrent impact of 
Orders (through robust monitoring of compliance).   Low numbers of imposed orders, combined 
with limited Scottish media interest in publicising the use of FBOs, weakens the prospects for a more 
general deterrent impact5.   
If the imposition of the banning order acts as a specific form of deterrence and the threat of a 
banning order, a general form of deterrence, then one might expect to see a direct impact on the 
                                                          
5
 Interviews with Scottish Football Banning Order Authority, 23rd August 2010 and 22nd July 2013  
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level of football related disorder/ violence. Indeed, relatively low levels of breach rates for banning 
orders (the statistics for 2011-12 show around 2% of banning orders are breached per season) 
suggest a degree of compliance with the conditions of the order, though any long-tem impact on 
violence is both difficult to measure and thus questionable.    Analysis of the extent of disorder 
involving English football supporters abroad pre and post the implementation of banning orders 
indicates some impact might be observed. For example, Table 4 uses arrest data to compare the 
levels of disorder involving England supporters at the six international tournaments where England 
qualified prior to the mass implementation of banning orders (pre the world cup in Japan/ Korea 
2002) and the five tournaments since. As McArdle (2000) points out there were tournaments prior 
to Japan/ Korea 2002 where some restriction/ bans were in place (such as in France 1998 and 
Belgium/ Holland 2000), though large numbers of bans were not in place until 2002. Prior to 2002 
disorder and large numbers of arrests of England supporters was relatively common. Of course, 
caution has to be expressed. Such numbers of arrests may purely relate to policing activities in the 
host countries (in Italy 1990 over zealous policing tactics were flagged as a human rights concern 
(Law Gazette, 1990) and Frosdick and Marsh (2005) suggest indiscriminate arrests and deportations 
were made at Euro 2002). However, over a thousand banning orders were in place for Japan 2002; 
2000 for Portugal 2004 and in the region of 3000 for Germany 2006, South Africa 2010 and Poland/ 
Ukraine 2012. Both Japan and Portugal saw little serious disorder, despite large numbers of 
travelling English supporters. In relation to Japan 2002; Pearson (2006) asserts, ‘a lack of disorder at 
the 2002 World Cup saw claims by the media, academics, the Football Authorities and the Home 
Office that FBOs had played a vital role in preventing hooliganism at the tournament’. However, 
several arrests were made in Germany, mainly as a result of disorder in Stuttgart. South Africa 2010 
and Poland/ Ukraine 2012 remained largely trouble-free.     
At first glance the evidence for banning orders looks strong, though a number of further 
observations might be made. Disorder has often surfaced when England plays in major tournaments 
in Europe and prior to 2002 none of the tournaments were outside of the continent. After the 
widespread implementation of banning orders two tournaments were outside of Europe, disorder 
was observed in Germany in 2006 (when large numbers of bans were in place), though Portugal 
2004 and Poland/ Ukraine 2012 were trouble free. Stott et al (2008:115) suggest the lack of disorder 
in Portugal might have been the result of the style of non-paramilitary policing ‘adopted in cities 
hosting tournament matches’. A lack of disorder in Poland/ Ukraine 2012 might partially explained 
by the relatively small number of England fans that travelled, though for a tournament where 
problems were predicted (and occurred between Polish and Russian fans) the absence of disorder 
involving England fans is noteworthy. However, whilst the UK government remain convinced of the 
impact of banning orders at international tournaments, the potential for disorder (as evidence by 
Germany 2006) still seems apparent when England take large numbers of supporters to European 
countries.  Further weight to support the efficacy of banning orders might be made by pointing to 
the relative absence of disorder involving English club teams in European competition. That said, a 
UEFA report in 2007 branded Liverpool supporters the ‘worst in Europe’ for their behaviours since 
2003 where a total a 25 incidents involving their supporters had been catalogued (BBC News, 2007). 
However, the report primary related to problems surrounding the 2007 Champions League final 
where poor stewarding and ticket allocation led to thousands of ticketless fans travelling to the 
game.  
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Table 4: Disorder and arrests at the five major tournaments involving England supporters pre and post 
widespread implementation of football banning orders in 2000.  
Tournament Banning orders in place 
(approx) 
Evidence of disorder involving 
England supporters 
European Championships- 
West Germany 1988  
- 381 arrests of England Supporters.  
World Cup- Italy 1990 - Mass deportation of over 200 England 
supporters, despite the tournament 
being relatively trouble-free 
European Championship- 
Sweden 1992 
- 250 England fans arrested for violence 
and disorder.  
European Championship- 
England 1996 
- 942 arrests for violence and disorder.  
World Cup- France 1998 70 restriction orders 278 arrests for violence and disorder 
 
European Championship- 
Belgium/ Holland 2000 
106 banning orders (1999 
Football Offences Act) 
945 arrests  
Commencement of widespread implementation of banning orders 
 
World Cup-Japan/ Korea 
2002 
1,053 13 arrests (1 for disorder) 
 
European Championship-
Portugal 2004 
2,188 53 arrests- though mainly in holiday 
resorts 
World Cup-Germany 2006 3,000 Around 400 arrested as England and 
German supporters threw missiles at 
each other in Stuttgart. In total around 
800 arrested or detained.  
 
World Cup-South Africa 2010 3,200 No arrests of England supporters 
 
European Championship-
Poland/ Ukraine 2012 
2,800 No arrests of England supporters  
 
The evidence in relation to the impact on domestic hooliganism is less compelling.  Figure 1 
compares data in relation to the numbers of banning orders issued from the 2001-2002 season to 
numbers of arrests made within a period of 24 hours either side of all football league matches in 
England & Wales from the 1992-93 season (eight years before the 2000 Football Disorder Act) 
through to 2011/126. This shows that the reduction in arrests at football matches seems to be part 
of a continuing long-term trend rather than an outcome of the imposition of the banning order. As 
illustrated, the numbers of arrests at football matches7 fell rapidly from 4,588 in 1992-92 to 3,000 in 
2001-20028. After implementation of the order in August 2001, one might expect to see arrests fall 
                                                          
6 This covers all arrests designated in law under schedule 1 of the Football Spectators Act 1989 (as amended) reported by police to the 
Football Banning Orders Authority. This includes football specific offences (e.g. throwing missiles in a stadium, pitch encroachment) and a 
wide range of generic criminal offences committed in connection with a football match. 
7 The data here is for all arrests as arrest data for violence and disorder are not available prior to 2000/01. Therefore, this includes violence 
and public disorder, missile throwing, racist chanting, pitch incursion, alcohol offences, ticket touting, carrying offensive weapons and 
property offences.   
8
 Though no comparable, centrally-collated arrest figures are available for Scotland over this period, the overwhelming consensus of 
professionals interviewed during the football banning order evaluation was that a similar trend had existed in Scotland over roughly the 
same period (see Hamilton-Smith et. al., 2011) 
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at an increased rate. However, despite the rapid implementation of banning orders from 687 in 
August 2001 to a peak of 3,387 in August 2006, the arrest rate continued to fall at the same pace.  
Figure 1: Comparison of banning orders and arrests1992-93 to 2011-2012 
 
Source: national statistics on football banning orders 
Of course, a number of factors might be attributed to declining numbers in hooligan incidents. The 
installation of CCTV in stadiums, all seated stadiums and stricter ticketing policies have all been cited 
as reasons (Frosdick & Marsh, 2005). However, it has also been suggested that the installation of 
security objects such as CCTV have helped to displace incidents away from stadiums and encouraged 
hooligans to carefully plan where ‘meets’ will occur (in the absence of police attention). Indeed, 
evidence exists to suggest that hooligans have pre-arranged fights away from stadiums and this 
observation does raise some questions about official interpretations of the success of banning 
orders. On the one hand, Hopkins (2013) identifies that police officers claim banning orders have 
been effective by controlling risk supporters and dismantling hooligan firms, though police officers 
also suggest that disorder involving risk supporters can often take place in locations unknown to 
them.  If this is true, then potentially, many incidents may occur that are unknown to the police and 
these may involve risk supporters with banning orders in place.  
As official data sources might be deemed an unreliable indicator of the levels of disorder, further 
exploratory research was completed in order to try and ascertain what impact banning orders have 
on the behaviours of risk supporters.  This included conducting an online survey with football 
supporters. Online surveys are limited in that it can be difficult to obtain reasonable response rates, 
a representative sample and to ensure valid responses are made to questions (Fielding et al, 2008). 
In order to explore the views of football supporters in relation to banning orders it might have been 
more desirable to have conducted face-to-face interviews with a representative sample of risk 
supporters. However, an online survey does represent a quick (and relatively cheap) way to quickly 
canvass opinion on a subject (Fielding et al, 2008). The survey was administered between April and 
July 2013. In order to try and ensure that ‘risk supporters’ were contacted a link to the survey was 
posted on a number of websites that were (a) either specifically set up to discuss football 
hooliganism or hooligan culture/ clothing or (b) where football hooliganism was a subject of 
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discussion on message boards (see appendix A). The survey asked respondents about a number of 
themes in relation to banning orders, including:  
1. Whether respondents have ever had a banning order; 
2. If respondents considered the last banning order they received to be fair;  
3. What impact banning orders had on their behaviour/ the behaviour of risk supporters 
generally.  
In total, 199 responses were received. Of these 20% (n=39) said they were currently regularly 
involved in hooligan activities (29 or 74% of this group had previously received a banning order) and 
a further 27% (n=54) of the total sample indicated that they would not shy away from trouble if it 
came to them. Of the total sample, 45% (n=90) had previously received a banning order (20 had 
received two or more) of which 20% (n=18) said the last order received was via the civil (14b) route.   
A total of 64 respondents who had received a banning order in the past were able to describe their 
involvement with hooliganism at the time the order was imposed. Of these, 61% (n=39) said they 
were prominent members of hooligan firms and a further 28% (n=18) said they were not involved 
with a hooligan firm, but were happy to get involved in trouble if came to them. Worryingly, 11% 
(n=7) supporters who had received a banning order said they had not been involved in any hooligan 
activities at all.  
Just under half of the total sample (48%: n=96) thought that banning orders gave the police too 
much power and of the 90 who had previously received a banning order nearly half (48%: n=43) 
thought that restrictions imposed on them were unfair. Indeed, several respondents also suggested 
they were either ‘stitched up’ or made claims that bans were received on top of a sentence for 
minor indiscretions they considered to be a part of supporting a football team. For example, 
comments included:  
-I encroached an asphalt track behind a goal through an already open emergency exit whilst 
celebrating a goal. 
-I was arrested for being drunk in a football stadium, although I had only fallen asleep. 
-I was not involved in the said offence, but pleaded guilty under the direction of a solicitor to avoid a 
lengthy court case and time off work. 
Evidence of the impact of banning orders on the behaviour of risk supporters suggested that the 
impact might be one of behaviour modification, rather than desistance from hooliganism altogether. 
All respondents were asked what they thought the impact of banning orders was on hooliganism in 
relation to their football club/ hooligan firm. The findings, illustrated in Figure 2, show that 59% 
(n=85) believed FBOs have made hooligans more selective when they turn out (in order to avoid 
police attention), 29% (n=41) claim that banning orders have made little difference at all as 
hooligans still regularly turn out when they want, though 12% (n=17) did suggest that FBOs have 
destroyed hooligan firms. 
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Figure 2: The impact of banning orders on hooliganism: supporter views 
 
Source: online survey: response = 143. 
Indeed, this is further verified by responses from those previously subject to a banning order. A total 
of 63 respondents commented on the impact of receiving a banning order on their behaviour.  Three 
distinct outcome patterns could be observed.  
1. Behaviour modification: a total of 37% (n=23) said their behaviour changed as a result of 
the order. This group became more selective about when and where they turned out to seek 
disorder- they continued to be involved in hooliganism, but to a lesser extent.  
2. Desistance from hooliganism: a total of 30% (n=19) said they either stopped going to 
football altogether or they continued to attend matches, but were no longer involved in any 
hooligan activities.  
3. Continuation of behaviour: a total of 33% (n=21) said the banning order made no difference 
to them. They were still involved in hooliganism to the same extent as prior to the order.  
Of course, the evidence has to be treated with a high degree of caution, though there is a suggestion 
that the impact of orders on hooliganism- at least in the domestic context- might be more limited 
than suggested in official circles.   Indeed, research by Hopkins (2013) notes that banning orders may 
have the impact of making risk supporters more selective about when they turn out for violence (as 
indicated by the behaviour modification group). As has been witnessed in recent years, football is 
still an arena where opportunities for confrontation exist and certain fixtures can generate 
expectations of violence. Rather than take out the risk element altogether, the banning order may 
be part of a process that has changed patterns of football violence from the more regular 
occurrences witnessed in the 1980’s to one where many risk supporters now only turn out 
occasionally and most notably for games where the expectation of violence is high.   
Conclusion 
The term the ‘football hooligan industry’ was initially used to describe the development of measures 
designed to control football violence by the New Right post 1979 (see Giulianotti, 1994). Our analysis 
suggests the industry has continued to develop as successive governments have continued to 
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implement control legislation targeted towards football supporters thought to be part of a ‘risk’ 
group. Dual narratives can be observed in relation to football fandom that are partially used by 
government, media and the police to justify the continued imposition of such control orders.  On the 
one hand there is a narrative of ‘change’ where it is suggested a growing family culture exists within 
the game, where face-painted fans, wearing club football shirts, singing non-sectarian, non-racist, 
non-aggressive songs support their football team. On the other hand a narrative of ‘continuation’ 
exists where it is suggested a hooligan or risk-element still lurk in the background- confrontational, 
nationalistic and considered by the government, media and police as relics from bygone era when 
football hooliganism was at its peak. Repressive forms of legislation have been implemented in order 
to prevent hooliganism domestically and abroad, justified in official circles by the suggestion that 
football violence remains a persistent threat (or that sectarianism remains a persistent threat in 
Scotland). In both jurisdictions, the suggestion that hooliganism is a persistent threat is serviced by 
occasional outbreaks of disorder (or sectarian unrest) at matches that are commonly subjected to an 
amplification process by the media. This in turn, reinforces the perception that more restrictive 
controls- such as FBOs- are necessary to control the problem.  
The FBO legislation is hybrid in that restrictions can be imposed on conviction or compliant. As 
alluded to by Stott & Pearson (2006, 2008) this creates a moral dilemma - whether human rights 
should pervade over the threats posed by football ‘risk’ supporters.  Although legal judgements have 
been passed on the extent violence needs to be related to football and that restrictions imposed 
need to justify the end goal of preventing violence, in practice the process of implementation 
appears to vary from area to area and concerns have been raised over the unfair imposition upon 
some supporters. Moreover, a perception exits among some groups that FBO’s give the police too 
much power and on occasion normal passionate fan behaviour gets criminalised (FSF, 2013). This 
perception is particularly acute in Scotland, where displays of fan rivalry, that might be deemed 
banal in most jurisdictions (e.g. singing and displaying banners), are officially viewed as sectarian and 
thereby inherently liable to provoke disorder, justifying in turn, police intervention. As Waiton 
(2013) asserts questions need to be asked about the extent that fan behaviours are now being 
criminalised. In their classic study of the behaviours of football supporters, Marsh, Rosser & Harré 
(1979) claimed there are rules of disorder where much non-contact ritualised aggression occurs 
between football supporters. It has been suggested throughout this chapter that many forms of 
behaviour that once would not have attracted police attention may now result in restrictive 
measures being imposed. One might conclude that the increased use of restrictive and repressive 
powers allows for greater monitoring/ surveillance of what the government, media and police 
consider to be unacceptable behaviours/fandom or unacceptable groups. Thus, risk groups as they 
are labelled become subject to a form of tribal stigma as identified by Goffman, (1963) where 
deviations from what is considered to be the prevailing normative behaviour is stigmatised. Thus, 
wearing certain types of clothing, saying certain things, being with certain people and waving certain 
flags can stimulate police attention and ultimately a control order. 
Despite the absence of any independent evaluation of the impact of orders on the behaviour of risk 
supporters, a surprising degree of confidence exists in official circles about their efficacy. At an 
international level, our analysis suggests disorder has declined in relation to the England football 
team since the widespread imposition of orders, though when the correct chemistries for violence 
are in place (mass numbers of supporters, European location, high alcohol consumption, aggressive 
policing) disorder may still occur.   Moreover, our online survey indicates the receipt of a banning 
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order encouraged less than a third of respondents to desist completely from hooliganism; whereas 
others either modified their behaviour to enable them to continue to participate in hooliganism or 
continued their hooligan activities.   
Whether banning orders can be central to a long-term strategy to prevent football violence or 
sectarianism remains unclear. Efforts to target ‘risk groups’ may yield short-term benefits in 
curtailing the activities of some of the main hooligans associated with firms. However, recent events 
at Wembley and Newcastle highlight that football still attracts a risk element prepared to engage in 
disorder. Also, evidence of the emergence of new ‘youth firms’ illustrates that some younger 
supporters are keen to engage in ‘casual subcultures’ (Hopkins, 2013). The recent renewed 
government commitment to the use of banning orders to prevent disorder and also to target 
homophobic chanting (see ACPO  & CPS, 2013) during these times of relative calm in world of English 
and Scottish football violence suggests (1) both governments have faith in efficacy of these 
measures and (2) criticisms over the more draconian aspects of the legislation are of little concern. 
However, if the banning order has helped to assure the future of the football hooliganism industry, it 
remains to be seen if this industry represents value for money in these times of austerity. 
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Appendix A: Examples of websites approached for online survey   
Birmingham City Zulu: 
 https://www.facebook.com/pages/Birmingham-Zulus/144473835566717 
Cardiff Soul Crew:  
https://en-gb.facebook.com/pages/Cardiff-City-Soul-Crew-are-the-hardest-football-firm-in-
Britain/263330993680421 
Derby Lunatic Fringe: 
 http://www.network54.com/Forum/337244/  
Forest Executive Crew:  
https://www.facebook.com/pages/FEC-FOREST-EXECUTIVE-CREW/218498430959 
Leeds Service Crew:  
http://www.network54.com/Forum/283664/ 
Owls Crime Squad:  
https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.10151611406954728.1073741846.175974659727&ty
pe=3 
Newcastle Gremlins:  
https://www.facebook.com/pages/Newcastle-Gremlins/108241589218692 
Southampton Casuals:   
http://www.network54.com/Forum/474836/ 
Stoke Naughty Forty 
https://www.facebook.com/pages/Stoke-Naughty-40/261969827151433 
 
